

Voters' Partisan Behaviour and Government's Election Strategies for Local Funding Provision: Theory and Empirical Evidence in Australia

Muhammad F. NORAZMAN (B.Economics)

Supervisor: Dr. Eran Binenbaum

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School of Economics

### Declaration

Except where appropriately acknowledged this thesis is my own work, has been expressed in my own words and has not previously submitted for assessment.

Muhammad Fadhli Norazman November 1st 2013

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#### Abstract

Firstly, this thesis aims to demonstrate theoretically that different proportion of partisan and non-partisan voters entails different election strategies for the government when it provides local funding. Secondly, this thesis aims to find the empirical evidence of the existence of government's election strategies and if they do exist, what are the exact strategies chosen by the government. These election strategies are whether to fund marginal or safe electorates, and whether to fund aligned or unaligned electorates. Four predictions are yielded from the theoretical model discussed in this thesis and two of them are empirically tested in Australia. The empirical results contradict the theoretical predictions.

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