mineral, and other forms of poisoning among his patients. On the medical unit would devolve the responsibility, now assigned to the nurse or sanitary inspector, of executing the measures required for the prevention of infection by contacts and carriers, and of carrying out, in conjunction with the district health officer or education authority the examination of school children, and other duties prescribed by the district officer, for which services he would be remunerated.

More important is the change contemplated in the status of the district health officer. There are several defects in the present local system, one being that, in suburban and rural areas, at least, the district officer gives part of his time only to his public duties, the rest being required for his private practice. Another, and more serious trouble, is that he is appointed by the local authority, and holds his office at its pleasure. It is proposed that every district officer should give the whole of his time to his public duties, and be responsible, not to any local body, but to the State health authorities. The delegation of large discretionary powers in the matter of health to the local authority by Parliament necessarily results in considerable diversity of administration. Some local authorities are zealous, disinterested, and enlightened; others are, in the French phrase, pas si bien. They need medical pressure, which an appointee of their own is not in a position to exert, but which could and would be exerted were the district officer independent of the council. The larger areas would have separate officers, but smaller towns or rural districts, where the work was lighter, would be grouped and share an officer between them. Victoria has already done something in the way of dividing itself into areas under the supervision of full-time medical officers, though as yet the latter are employed almost wholly in sanitary surveys, and have not the control over the local practitioners, nurses, and others, essential under the proposed scheme. A similar system of grouping and State organisation has found official advocates in New South Wales and Western Australia. Attached to the office of district medical supervisor would be inspectorial and nursing staffs, and—if the plan is carried out in its entirety—laboratory facilities, which could be supplied in connection with the research institutes already established by the Commonwealth in the different States. It is suggested that the salaries of the district health officers might be defrayed in part by the transfer to the States of the money paid by the Commonwealth as subsidies on venereal work and medical aid to invalid pensioners. As the district officer would have the assistance of local practitioners, so in turn he would be in communication with the State health officer, on whom would devolve the control of hospitals, for infectious diseases and other, food, drugs, and milk, together with the arrangements for combating infectious disease. The State officer similarly would be in regular communication with the chief Commonwealth officer, who would control the quarantine stations and district laboratories, and act as chief health adviser to the nation. The clearer definition of local, State and Federal functions which would follow the adoption of this plan, it is calculated, would bring under the care and treatment of responsible officials every phase of personal, social, and industrial health in the Commonwealth, thus in conjunction with our educational facilities enabling us, on the basis of sound bodies and minds, to build up that "A1 nation" of Mr. Lloyd George's never-to-be-forgotten epigram.

Register

30 JUL 1924

STUDY OF PERSONALITY.

Self, as Known by Psychology.

The second of a course of three lectures on "The machine, the individual, and the person," by Professor McKellar Stewart, was delivered at the Prince of Wales lecture room at the University on Tuesday night. Professor Stewart said the aim of the psychologist was primarily to describe experience and discover its systematic nature. He was concerned with those conscious processes by which the individual established relations with a world of objects. The fact that experience, regarded as mental process, had its own peculiar system and organization, was frequently obscured by the thought of consciousness as merely a kind of light into which objects came, and out of which they again glided. The total inadequacy of such a thought was revealed by the findings of psychology. Consciousness was active, or it was nothing at all, and the psychologist had been able to reveal the systematic nature of such activity. Mental process was found to be a self-directing development, the texture of which consisted in individual thoughts, feelings, and seekings, which existed not as inert states, but as functioning members within a total developing process. In that process the past entered into the present, and operated there, as character and tendency. The process had also its forward look. It gnawed into the future. Those characteristics of the conscious process had been expounded in an interesting way in the earlier works of Henri Bergson. Results of earlier experiences were conserved, and in the solution of theoretical and practical problems were concentrated at the growing point of advance. Those results gave meaning to the experience of the moment, make better thought possible, aroused definite expectations, and rendered action more definite and precise. The whole process was self-integrating, self-directing. It could not, therefore, be explained in terms of concepts, which applied to a mere succession of mechanically determined events.

Development of Intelligence.

In the individual, as well as in the race, mental process manifested successive stages of development. It began with sensory experience, knowledge at that stage being confined to ill differentiated sensation—just enough to guide the bodily behaviour of the young child or the animal. At the second stage there was what was known as perceptual intelligence. Things were now differentiated, and acquired meanings, were wedded to the immediate sensory experience of the moment. Things were mentally associated in such a way that when one was repeated there was expectation of the other. The result of that development of intelligence was that more precise and varied bodily action was rendered possible. The third stage in the development of intelligence was conditioned by the power of forming abstract ideas, grasping universals as distinguished from bare particulars. Here they had the birth of the scientific reason, for the conditions were present which enabled the mind to grasp the idea of an objective world systematically connected. In that development from merely sensory to scientific intelligence there was real advance. The later stage might grow out of the earlier, but it was essentially different from it. The advance consisted in raising the earlier processes successively to a higher plane, a higher power. The reality of the advance was evidenced by the fact that at the highest plane science, art, morality, and religion were rendered possible.

The Emotional System.

The systematic, and peculiar, nature of mental process had had light thrown upon it by progress recently made in the psychological investigation of emotional experience. The unit, so to speak, of the emotional life, was known as a primary emotional system. Its central factor was an active tendency or end, the moving power of the system. The tendency of anger, for example, was to remove or destroy an opposing object; the tendency of fear was to avoid a threatening danger. Each emotional system had its distinctive tendency, and within that tendency thoughts, bodily impulses, organic sensations, were organized in the service of the end of the system. In human life those primary systems became organized in what were known as sentiments or enthusiasms, operative powers which constituted the basis of character. The self, then, as it appeared to psychology, was something very concrete, very active, very complex, which possessed its own systematic nature. The results of past experience were conserved, and operated as enduring capacities, faculties, or dispositions. The psychological self was defined in terms of its enduring capacities as revealed in the course of experience. It was the systematic unity of conscious experiences, penetrated throughout, and organized by those persistent and growing tendencies. It owed its complexity, its whole structure and character, to the consolidated experience of which it was the organized unity. In the self they had the true type of individuality, an individual which made itself by its own active experiences. Such an individual was of so concrete a nature that the suggestion had been hazarded that it might survive the shock of bodily dissolution.

Advertiser

INDIVIDUALITY AFTER DEATH

PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

The possibility of the survival of individuality after death was dealt with by Professor J. McKellar Stewart in a lecture delivered at the Prince of Wales Theatre at the University on Tuesday evening.

The lecturer, who contended that in an enquiry into personality psychology must be supplemented by philosophy, said the aim of the psychologist was primarily to describe experience and discover its systematic nature. He was concerned with those conscious processes by which the individual established relations with a world of objects. The fact that experience, regarded as mental process, had its own peculiar system and organisation was frequently obscured by the thought of consciousness, as merely a kind of light into which objects came and out of which they could again glide. The total inadequacy of such a thought was revealed by the findings of psychology. Consciousness was active or it was nothing at all, and the psychologist had been able by methods of his own to reveal the systematic nature of such activity.

Mental process was found to be a self-directing development, the texture of which consisted in individual thoughts, feelings, and seekings, which existed not as inert states, but as functioning members within a total developing process. In this process the past entered into the present and operated there as character and tendency. The process had also its forward look; it gnawed into the future. Those characteristics of conscious process had been expounded in a striking and original way by Henri Bergson in his earlier works. Results of earlier experience were conserved, and in the solution of theoretical and practical problems concentrated at the growing points of advance. Those results gave meaning to the experience of the moment, making better thought possible, arousing definite expectations, and rendering actions more definite and precise. The whole process was thus self-integrating and self-directing. It could not, therefore, be suitably explained in terms of concepts, which would apply to a mere succession of mechanically determined events.

In the individual, as well as in the race, mental process manifested successive stages of development. It began with sensory experience, knowledge at this stage being confined to ill-differentiated sensation, just enough to guide the bodily behaviour of the young child or the animal. At the second stage there was what was known as perceptual intelligence. Things were differentiated, and acquired meanings, wedded to the immediate sensory experience of the moment. Things were mentally associated in such a way that when one was repeated there was expectation of the other. The result of that developoment of intelligence was that more precise and varied bodily activity was rendered possible. The third stage in the development of intelligence was conditioned by the power of forming abstract ideas, grasping universals as distinguished from bare particulars. Here they had the birth of the scientific reason; for the conditions were present which enabled the mind to grasp the idea of an objectitve world systematically connected. In this development from merely sensory to scientific intelligence there had been real advance. The later stage might grow out of the earalier, but it was essentially different from it. The advance consisted in raising the earlier processes successively to a higher plane, a higher power. The reality of the advance was evidenced by the fact that at the highest plane, science, art, morality, and religion had become possible.

The systematic and peculiar nature of mental process had had light thrown upon it by progress recently made in the psychological investigation of emotional experience. The unit of the emotional life was known as a primary emotional system. Its central factor was an active tendency or end, the moving power of the system. The tendency of anger, for example, was to remove or destroy an opposing object; the tendency of fear was to avoid a threatening danger. Each emotional system had its distinctive tendency, and within this tendency, thoughts, bodily impulses, and organic sensations were organised in the service of the end of the system. In human life those primary systems became organised in what were known as sentiments or enthusiasms, operattive powers which constituted the basis of character.

The self, as it appeared to psychology, was something concrete, and active, something very complex, and which possessed its own systematic nature. The results of past experience were conserved and operated as enduring capacities, or faculties, or dispositions. The psychological self was defined in terms of its enduring capacities as revealed in the course of experience. It was the systematic unity of conscious experiences, penetrated throughout and organised by these persistent and growing tendencies. It owed its complexity, its whole structure, and character to the consolidated experience of which it was the organised unity. In the self they had the true type of individuality, an individual which made itself by its own active experiences. Such an individual was of so concrete a nature that the suggestion had been hazarded that it might survive the shock of bodily dissolution.

Bould

Register

30 JUL 1924

MARSUPIAL BIRTH.

To the Editor.

Sir—Realizing the futility of trying to convince men, who, in addition to their lack of knowledge of anatomy, physiology, and embyology, have made up their minds not to be convinced, I do not propose to enter into any argument on this subject; but I would recommend those who still have open minds to inspect the specimens in the Adelaide Museum. There are there two embryos of wallaby and one of the Australian opossum, taken from the uteri of their mothers. Two of them, one wallaby and the opossum, are not so easy of interpretation to the layman; but the third, a wallaby, is clearly seen to be still enclosed in the foetal membranes, and is attached by the umbilical cord to the rudimentary placenta. Of course, I do not expect that the bushmen will be influenced by this evidence, or by any other which does not support their pet theory, but it may be of value to those who are still undecided. The specimens are on the ground floor in the second showcase to the left as you enter the main door.—I am, Sir, &c.,

A. M. MORGAN.

Sir—The onlooker sees most of the game, and at Professor Wood Jones's lecture at the University last week, on the birth of the kangaroo, an impartial looker-on, who was also a stranger to both parties, was able to follow the game very clearly. If it had been possible to decide such a question by vote, the £100 for the Children's Hospital would be now in the hands of its treasurer. The challenge was sent to Professor Wood Jones, he accepted it, he produced his evidence, and the evidence of any scientist should not be lightly disregarded by any one. He played the game—and publicly. Any one was free to listen to his demonstration; any one was welcome to examine his specimens. It is up to "Old Bushwoman's" adherents to also play the game—and publicly to explain why they could not accept Professor Wood Jones's theory, and to produce their evidence, which should be as good and thorough as his. "I say" and "we say" would not be sufficient. Otherwise, though the £100 remains in "Bushwoman's" bank, the game is to the professor.—I am, Sir, &c.,

"THE SPECTATOR."

Sir—Before seeing specimens and hearing Professor Wood Jones lecture, I was always of the opinion that the young of the kangaroo and wallaby were formed on the nipple; now, I am quite convinced they are born like any other animal, and find their way to the nipple with the help of the mother. To settle this argument for those who still disbelieve that the young are born so, I would like to hear that some rich man had given the professor a large donation, or for your paper to open a research fund, to pay the expenses, so that the professor can get more live material; also for him to go to the different places where they are killing-off kangaroos and wallabies, cut the uterus out of all the females, and put them in pickle, and, when he has obtained a large number, cut them open on the chance of finding an embryo inside one of them. This for the benefit of disbelievers.—I am, Sir, &c.,

"J. M. C."

(Our correspondent has forwarded £1 1/ to start the suggested research fund.—Ed.)

Sir—It is dreadful to think that a wrong conception has to be handed down to posterity re the birth of the kangaroo. Professor Wood Jones based his arguments purely on theory. Any one stating that the kangaroo and wallaby are not born from the nipple (teat) is wrong. It is no use professors or any one else stating that they are born with "legs and feet," and then evolve a movement up into the pouch and on to the nipple. That is not natural, and is impossible. But it is futile to argue with one that has had no practical knowledge.—I am, Sir, &c.,

A. BEVISS.