Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/108054
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Type: Conference paper
Title: Last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical
Author: Liu, F.
Yarom, Y.
Ge, Q.
Heiser, G.
Lee, R.
Citation: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015 / vol.2015-July, pp.605-622
Publisher: IEEE
Issue Date: 2015
Series/Report no.: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ISBN: 9781467369497
ISSN: 1081-6011
2375-1207
Conference Name: Security and Privacy (SP) (17 May 2015 - 21 May 2015 : San Jose, CA)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser, Ruby B. Lee
Abstract: We present an effective implementation of the PRIME+PROBE side-channel attack against the lastlevel cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or virtual machine monitor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.
Keywords: Side-channel attack; cross-VM side channel; covert channel; last-level cache; ElGamal;
Rights: © 2015, Fangfei Liu. Under license to IEEE.
RMID: 0030038306
DOI: 10.1109/SP.2015.43
Appears in Collections:Computer Science publications

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