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Type: Book chapter
Title: Singular thoughts, seeing doubles and delusional misidentification
Author: Gerrans, P.
Citation: Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan - Volume 2, 2014 / Reboul, A. (ed./s), pp.235-248
Publisher: Springer
Publisher Place: Switzerland
Issue Date: 2014
ISBN: 3319051458
Statement of
Philip Gerrans
Abstract: In this chapter, I will suggest (i) that Kevin Mulligan has given a powerful analysis which suggests that the descriptive account of perception is incomplete: We perceive not only properties of objects but objects themselves, (ii) that problems for descriptive theories and the solutions identified by philosophers such as Mulligan (following, among others, Husserl; see Mulligan and Smith, Grazer Philos Stud 28:133–163, 1986; Mulligan, West Ont Ser Philos Sci 62:163–194, 1999) are the basis for contemporary cognitive theories of object tracking, (iii) that theories of object tracking help explain the phenomenology of delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS). DMS are best explained on the assumption that we perceive objects, not just their properties. The objects in question are selves. The claim defended here is that when we see a familiar face we see a particular person, not merely an assembly of facial features from which we infer the identity of their owner. The way in which we see that person is the same way in which we see an object in virtue of its perceptual appearance
Rights: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
RMID: 0030040097
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_16
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Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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