Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/108864
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Type: Conference paper
Title: Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets
Author: Guo, M.
Sakurai, Y.
Todo, T.
Yokoo, M.
Citation: Proceeding of the 19th International Conference International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems: PRIMA 2016, 2016 / vol.9862 LNCS, pp.181-196
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Issue Date: 2016
Series/Report no.: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (LNCS, vol. 9862)
ISBN: 9783319448312
ISSN: 0302-9743
1611-3349
Conference Name: 19th International Conference International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems: PRIMA 2016 (22 Aug 2016 - 26 Aug 2016 : Phuket, Thailand)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, B, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo
Abstract: We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.
Rights: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
RMID: 0030054699
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
Appears in Collections:Computer Science publications

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