Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109201
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dc.contributor.authorMezzetti, C.-
dc.contributor.authorRenou, L.-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical Economics, 2017; 12(1):249-285-
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109201-
dc.description.abstractWe study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.”-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityClaudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherWiley Online Library-
dc.rightsCopyright © 2017 The Authors. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te1988-
dc.subjectDynamic monotonicity; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity; repeated implementation; repeated games-
dc.titleRepeated Nash implementation-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE1988-
dc.relation.granthttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP120102697-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

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