Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109482
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers |
Author: | Englmaier, F. Muehlheusser, G. Roider, A. |
Citation: | European Economic Review, 2014; 67:82-106 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Issue Date: | 2014 |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider |
Abstract: | Abstract not available |
Keywords: | Knowledge workers; moral hazard; limited commitment; ex post outside option |
Rights: | © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.006 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.006 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Economics publications |
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RA_hdl_109482.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 990.7 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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