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Type: Journal article
Title: Pride and prejudice: a case for reform of judicial recusal procedure
Author: Appleby, G.
McDonald, S.
Citation: Legal Ethics, 2017; 20(1):89-114
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Issue Date: 2017
ISSN: 1460-728X
Statement of
Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonaldc
Abstract: Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals.
Keywords: Judicial ethics; recusal; bias
Description: Published Online: 7 December 2016
Rights: © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
RMID: 0030065363
DOI: 10.1080/1460728x.2017.1261521
Appears in Collections:Law publications

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