Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/115756
Citations
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
?
?
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEagle, A.en
dc.date.issued2019en
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophical Studies, 2019; 176(3):781-802en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116en
dc.identifier.issn1573-0883en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/115756-
dc.description.abstractA previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityAntony Eagleen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018en
dc.subjectChance; determinism; unsettledness; indeterminacy; laws; undermining; context-dependenceen
dc.titleChance, determinism, and unsettlednessen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.rmid0030081225en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-018-1039-1en
dc.identifier.pubid392871-
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
pubs.library.teamDS10en
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.