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|Title:||Agency and policy|
|Citation:||Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2004; 104(1):315-327|
|Garrett Cullity, Philip Gerrans|
|Abstract:||Michael Bratman is rightly celebrated for his planning theory of intention. On this theory, intentions are characterized by the role they play as elements in larger plans, the dual purpose of which is to extend the influence of our deliberation into the future, and to enable the intrapersonal and interpersonal coordination of our actions. Among the striking attractions of this account are the way it provides a rationale for distinguishing intentions from other mental states with which they combine-states such as belief and desire-and its ability to explain the norms governing the relationships amongst intentions, and between intentions and other mental states. If our plans are going to extend the in.uence of our deliberation into the future, then our intentions must resist reconsideration and translate into action; and if they are going to support intrapersonal and interpersonal coordination, they must be means-end coherent and consistent.|
|Description:||The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com|
|Rights:||Copyright status unknown|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
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