1. Adelaide Research & Scholarship
  2. Schools and Disciplines
  3. School of Humanities
  4. Philosophy
  5. Philosophy publications
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16164
Citations
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
?
?
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.-
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2004; 27(2):303-305-
dc.identifier.issn0140-525X-
dc.identifier.issn1469-1825-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16164-
dc.descriptionAuthor's response-
dc.description.abstractMartínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/ process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherCambridge University Press-
dc.rightsCopyright © 2004 Cambridge University Press-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04290070-
dc.titleVehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.provenancePublished online by Cambridge University Press 01 Apr 2004-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0140525X04290070-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 2
Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
O'Brien_16164.pdfPublished version76.65 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.