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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16848
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Protecting Eden: markets or government? |
Author: | Damania, Richard Hatch, John |
Citation: | Ecological Economics, 2005; 53 (3):339-351 |
Publisher: | Elsevier Science BV |
Issue Date: | 2005 |
ISSN: | 0921-8009 |
School/Discipline: | School of Economics |
Statement of Responsibility: | Richard Damania and John Hatch |
Abstract: | The majority of species classified as “threatened”, “endangered” or “vulnerable” by the IUCN are to be found in government-controlled parks and legally protected areas in developing countries. Dissatisfaction with the public sector's record in protecting endangered species has prompted calls for the use of market-based instruments and other economic incentives to promote more effective environmental outcomes. In this paper, we examine whether greater reliance on market-based incentives would result in improved environmental outcomes in national parks. We address this issue by extending the literature on optimal contracts to the case of a renewable resource. We identify conditions under which private ownership or control of a national park induces more (less) efficient management of protected areas. The paper concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the analysis and the implications of these results for the conservation of biodiversity. |
Keywords: | Species conservation; Incentives; National park management |
Description: | Copyright © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.09.015 |
Description (link): | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/503305/description#description |
Appears in Collections: | Economics publications |
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