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|Title:||Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence|
|Citation:||Proceedings of the Economic Society of Australia - 34th Conference of Economists, 2005 / Freebairn, J., Griffiths, B. (ed./s), pp.1-24|
|Part of:||Proceedings of the Economic Society of Australia - 34th Conference of Economists|
|Publisher:||The University of Melbourne|
|Publisher Place:||Melbourne, Australia|
|Conference Name:||The Economic Society of Australia - Conference of Economists (26 Sep 2005 : The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia)|
|Abstract:||We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic interdependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms of either output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms' behaviour in two dimensions - their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in both dimensions.|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
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