A game theoretical approach for resource bargaining in shared WCDMA networks: Symmetric and asymmetric models

Abstract

The high cost associated with the rollout of 3G services encourages operators to share network infrastructure. Network sharing poses a new challenge in devising fair, efficient and Pareto optimal resource allocation strategies to distribute system resources among users of different operators in the network. Cooperative game theory provides a framework for formulating such strategies. In this paper, we propose two models (i.e. symmetric and asymmetric) for cooperative resource bargaining in shared networks based on the concept of preference functions. The symmetric model assumes that all players have equal bargaining powers while in the asymmetric case, players are allowed to submit bids to the network operator to influence the final bargaining outcome. The bargaining solutions proposed vary according to a parameter β that considers the tradeoff between one’s gain and the losses of others. The well-known Nash and Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are special instances of the solutions proposed.