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|Title:||Desire and Self-Knowledge|
|Citation:||Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2007; 85(4):517-536|
|Publisher:||Oxford Univ Press|
|Abstract:||In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
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