Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/56181
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dc.contributor.authorPaeglis, I.en
dc.contributor.authorTirtiroglu, D.en
dc.date.issued2007en
dc.identifier.citationAdvances in Financial Economics: Issues in Corporate Governance and Finance, 2007 / Hirschey, M., John, K., Makhija, A. (ed./s), pp.137-164en
dc.identifier.isbn9780762313730en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/56181-
dc.description.abstractSome commentators suggest that the Wall Street views family firms with scepticism. The appointment of independent directors to form a majority on a firm's board of directors should constitute a strong signal to the market of a family firm's willingness to be monitored objectively and thus should alleviate Wall Street's scepticism. This is likely to be more important for the newly public family firms than for mature family firms since outsider-domination on the board pre-dates the involvement of other outsiders, such as underwriters, financial analysts, or institutional investors. Whether the presence of an independent board alleviates the market's scepticism may be evident in the responses of various external monitoring entities to the newly public family and non-family firms. Using a hand-collected sample of newly public firms, we cast brand-new light on whether an independent board provides any advantage to the newly public family firms in underwriter reputation, analyst coverage, and investment by institutional investors over newly public non-family firms. We find that independence of board of directors is overall a positive signal and that while the independence of board is more important than the independence of management for underwriters and financial analysts, the reverse is the case for institutional investors.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityImants Paeglis and Dogan Tirtirogluen
dc.description.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(07)12007-7en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltden
dc.relation.ispartofAdvances in Financial Economics ; 12en
dc.titleThe external monitoring bodies' view of the board independence in the new public family firmsen
dc.typeBook chapteren
dc.identifier.rmid0020094288en
dc.publisher.placeBingley, UKen
dc.identifier.pubid36428-
pubs.library.collectionBusiness School publicationsen
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
Appears in Collections:Business School publications

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