Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Journal article
Title: Evidence that stock options work for CEOs - but not for incentive reasons
Author: Rosser, B.
Canil, J.
Citation: Corporate Ownership and Control, 2009; 7(2):30-49
Publisher: Virtus Interpress
Issue Date: 2009
ISSN: 1727-9232
Statement of
Bruce A. Rosser and Jean M. Canil
Abstract: We document the first evidence of a structure of timing returns, award discounts/premia and CEO dilution costs relative to shareholders set at award and before the CEO invests marginal effort. All three factors affect CEOs’ effective exercise price and hence incentive to expend marginal effort. Exercised options, which exhibit the highest CEO and shareholder returns, are characterized by CEO acceptance of high dilution cost and high sensitivity to award premiums. CEO and shareholder returns for lapsed options and annual/biannual awards show high dependency on the dilution cost factor. Irregular awards are characterized by active pre-effort positioning by shareholders to reduce CEO opportunism.
RMID: 0020094544
DOI: 10.22495/cocv7i2p3
Description (link):
Appears in Collections:Business School publications

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.