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|Title:||Tax compliance by firms and audit policy|
|Citation:||Proceedings of the 25th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (EEA 2010), held in Glasgow, Scotland 23-26 August 2010: pp.1-16|
|Conference Name:||Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (25th : 2010 : Glasgow, Scotland)|
|Ralph Bayer and Frank Cowell|
|Abstract:||Firms are usually better informed than tax authorities about market conditions and the potential profits of competitors. They may try to exploit this situation by under-reporting their own taxable profits. The tax authority could offset firms informational advantage by adopting “smarter” audit policies that take into account the relationship between a firm’s reported profits and reports for the industry as a whole. Such an audit policy will create an externality for the decision makers in the industry and this externality can be expected to affect not only forms reporting policies but also their market decisions. If public policy takes into account wider economic issues than just revenue raising what is the appropriate way for a tax authority to run such an audit policy? We develop some clear policy rules in a standard model of an industry and show the effect of these rules using simulations.|
|Keywords:||Tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly|
|Rights:||Copyright status unknown|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
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