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Type: Journal article
Title: On the segmentation of markets
Author: Jacquet, Nicolas Laurent
Tan, Serene Sze-Ching
Citation: Journal of Political Economy, 2007; 115(4):639-664
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Issue Date: 2007
ISSN: 0022-3808
School/Discipline: School of Economics
Statement of
Nicolas L. Jacquet, Serene Tan
Abstract: This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.
Rights: © 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
RMID: 0020120820
DOI: 10.1086/521967
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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