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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/87304
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ellman, M. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Pezanis-Christou, P. | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The American Economic Review, 2010; 100(5):2478-2491 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1532-5059 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/87304 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates experimentally how a group's structure affects its ethical behavior towards a passive outsider. We analyze one vertical and two horizontal structures (one requiring consensus, one implementing a compromise by averaging proposals). We also control for internal communication. The data support our main predictions: (1) horizontal, averaging structures are more ethical than vertical structures (where subordinates do not feel responsible) and than consensual structures (where responsibility is dynamically diffused); (2) communication makes vertical structures more ethical (subordinates with voice feel responsible); (3) with communication, vertical structures are more ethical than consensual structures (where in-group bias hurts the outsider). | - |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Matthew Ellman and Paul Pezanis-Christou | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | American Economic Association | - |
dc.rights | Copyright status unknown | - |
dc.source.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2478 | - |
dc.title | Organizational structure, communication, and group ethics | - |
dc.type | Journal article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.100.5.2478 | - |
pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
dc.identifier.orcid | Pezanis-Christou, P. [0000-0001-6521-4139] | - |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 2 Economics publications |
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