Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/90971
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant |
Author: | Cullity, G.M. |
Citation: | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1999; 2(3):277-294 |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
Issue Date: | 1999 |
ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Garrett Cullity |
Abstract: | Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement. |
Keywords: | virtue ethics ethical theory moral epistemology moral judgement |
Rights: | © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1009903128864 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1009903128864 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 2 Philosophy publications |
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hdl_90971.pdf | Accepted version | 307.22 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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