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|Title:||The external monitoring bodies' view of the board independence in the new public family firms|
|Citation:||Advances in Financial Economics: Issues in Corporate Governance and Finance, 2007 / Hirschey, M., John, K., Makhija, A. (ed./s), pp.137-164|
|Part of:||Advances in Financial Economics ; 12|
|Publisher:||Emerald Group Publishing Ltd|
|Publisher Place:||Bingley, UK|
|Imants Paeglis and Dogan Tirtiroglu|
|Abstract:||Some commentators suggest that the Wall Street views family firms with scepticism. The appointment of independent directors to form a majority on a firm's board of directors should constitute a strong signal to the market of a family firm's willingness to be monitored objectively and thus should alleviate Wall Street's scepticism. This is likely to be more important for the newly public family firms than for mature family firms since outsider-domination on the board pre-dates the involvement of other outsiders, such as underwriters, financial analysts, or institutional investors. Whether the presence of an independent board alleviates the market's scepticism may be evident in the responses of various external monitoring entities to the newly public family and non-family firms. Using a hand-collected sample of newly public firms, we cast brand-new light on whether an independent board provides any advantage to the newly public family firms in underwriter reputation, analyst coverage, and investment by institutional investors over newly public non-family firms. We find that independence of board of directors is overall a positive signal and that while the independence of board is more important than the independence of management for underwriters and financial analysts, the reverse is the case for institutional investors.|
|Appears in Collections:||Business School publications|
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